House of the Wannsee-Conference
Memorial and Educational Site

PETER LONGERICH

Table of Contents

Part 1 
I. The genesis of the 'final solution' and historical research
II. The elements of the policy of annihilation

Part 2
III. Stages in the Nazi persecution of the Jews prior to the summer of 1941
IV. The transition to the policy of 'ethnic cleansing' in the summer of 1941

Part 3
V. Escalation in the autumn of 1941 and the start of the deportation of the German Jews
VI. Preparation for and postponement of the Wannsee Conference

Part 4
VII. The minutes of the Wannsee Conference
VIII. The escalation of the annihilation policy immediately after the Wannsee Conference

Part 5
IX. Outlines of a pan-European deportation programme
X. Expansion of the deportations and the move to indiscriminate murder

Part 6
XI. Review of developments between the autumn of 1941 and the summer of 1942
XII. The Wannsee minutes as snapshot of a moment in a transition stage

_______________

On 20 January 1942 Reinhard Heydrich, the chief of the security police and the SD, chaired a meeting of secretaries of state and high Party and SS officials. That meeting would pass into the history books as the ‘Wannsee Conference’. Taken by Adolf Eichmann, the minutes of this conference are one of the most important documents recorded on the planning and organization of the murder of European Jewry by the Nazi regime. Because of this document, the conference at Gross Wannsee has become synonymous with the cold-blooded, administratively organized and delegated Nazi genocide. The fact that, without comment, high-ranking representatives of the ministerial bureaucracy were taking note of the lecture being delivered by Heydrich on the fate of 11 million European Jews - in the relaxed and distinctively upper middle-class atmosphere of that SS guest-house - makes it alarmingly clear that responsibility for the genocide reached far beyond the realm of the SS.

I. The genesis of the ‘final solution’ and historical research

Historical research has long occupied itself with the question of what role the Wannsee Conference played within the planning and organization of the genocide of the European Jews. The answer to this question is not straightforward because, on 20 January 1942, when this conference was being held, mass murder of the Jews had already been under way for six months. Already several hundred thousand had been killed by the Nazi regime, particularly in the occupied Soviet territories, but also in Serbia, where the male Jewish population had fallen victim to the Wehrmacht’s systematic 'reprisals', and in the Warthegau, with the use of gas vans. Such acts show that the Wannsee Conference in no way heralded the beginning of the genocide. The conference was rather an important stage in the decision-making process that dragged on from the autumn of 1941 to the spring of 1942, in the course of which the leadership of the 'Third Reich' expanded the massacre of the Jews in eastern and southern Europe into a systematic programme for the destruction of all the European Jews.

Most historians assume that the conference must have been preceded by a fundamental decision to murder every Jew in Europe, and that the meeting was a forum for discussion of the organization and implementation of the genocide that was already underway (1). When such a fundamental decision is supposed to have been taken, however, is disputed. A series of historians have taken the view that this decision had already been made before the beginning of the Russian campaign. Others are of the opinion that the basic decision was taken in the summer of 1941 (2), in a feeling of euphoria at the predicted victory over the Soviet Union, or in the autumn of 1941, in light of the failure - which was already becoming clear - of the 'Blitzkrieg' in the east (3). Christian Gerlach has recently expressed the view that Hitler’s 'fundamental decision' to murder the European Jews was taken immediately after his declaration of war on the USA in December 1941. Gerlach's theory has caused a sensation and must be examined more closely (4). There are indications, however, that a final decision to murder all European Jews could only have been made during the spring or summer of 1942 (5). A radical counter-position adopted by Martin Broszat, for instance, holds that there was never any 'Führer’s decision', but that the destruction of the Jews was 'seen [by the Nazis] as "a way out" of a cul-de-sac into which they had manoeuvred themselves' (6).

The diverse views of these experts illustrate that the precise reconstruction of the decision-making process culminating in the 'final solution' is methodologically extraordinarily difficult. As regards the validation of sources, it is a laborious venture. The most important decisions leading to the murder of the European Jews would not as a rule have been committed to paper; to the extent that any documents reflected such decisions, the culprits sought systematically and with great success to destroy them. Moreover, the documents handed down despite all this are scattered among numerous archives in many countries. Additionally, the documents dealing with the murders themselves are worded obscurely – the Wannsee Conference protocol being an excellent example of this. In view of the problematic source material, a precise reconstruction of the individual criminal complexes that constituted the genocide of the European Jews is essential – namely, the executions, deportations, murders in the camps, etc. The disparate state of the sources leaves us no choice other than to trace the implementation of these crimes back to the decisions standing behind them.

The debate over the precise reconstruction of the decision-making process is – even if it sometimes has the appearance of an intensely contested debate between specialists over details – more than an argument about dates, itineraries and relations over responsibilities. The question of the beginning of the systematic murder of the European Jews is connected with basic issues of the interpretation of the Nazi dictatorship, the question of Hitler’s role, the functioning of the apparatus of power, the behavior of the élite, the role of anti-Semitism and racism and more besides. The dispute over the genesis of the 'final solution' involves finding answers not only to the questions of when and where, but also, ultimately, of why.

Research on the persecution and murder of the European Jews is currently in a state of upheaval. In particular, the opening up since 1990 of the previously inaccessible archives of the former Warsaw Pact countries has considerably enlarged the documentary base for research into the 'final solution'. This applies especially to the 'special archive' in Moscow, whose existence was unknown until 1991, and to countless regional archives in the former Soviet Union and in Poland, as well as the archives and secret archives of the former GDR.

The first studies benefiting from the new archival situation have appeared in the last few years. Initial regional studies are available, important documents have been published, and works on the decision-making process itself have materialized. Further investigations that should close important gaps will appear in the near future. Among the works that are already available, worthy of particular note are the studies by Dieter Pohl and Thomas Sandkühler (7) on the murder of the Jews in Galicia, Christian Gerlach's book on the SD's Jewish policy (8), Michael Wildt’s collection of documents on the SD’s Jewish policy (9), Götz Aly’s book on the 'final solution' (10) and Ralf Ogorreck’s study of the Einsatzgruppen (11). One of the most important documents now available for research is Himmler’s appointments diary. Christian Gerlach has recently evaluated this source for the first time with regard to the genesis of the 'final solution', and it has recently been published by a group of specialists who have already produced or will produce monographs on the history of the murder of the Jews (12).

The newly-appearing investigations produce a much more complete picture of the regional history of the murder of the European Jews, as well as of various individual aspects of the genocide. They help us to understand better the complexity of various events that are generally encapsulated in the term 'Holocaust'. However, though current research is mainly concerned with tracking down and opening up more and more documents, and assembling the still barely estimable number of fragments thus obtained, the results of this research, as always, depends on the framework of interpretation within which those documents are placed. Their interpretation is mainly determined by the question of what role we ascribe to the murder of the European Jews within the overall history of the 'Third Reich'.

The more that research results on the annihilation of the European Jews are assimilated, the clearer it becomes that this historical event cannot be understood as a mere 'desk murder' - i.e. the bureaucratic enactment of a discrete murder-order. The realization gradually dawns that we are dealing with a massacre lasting for several years on an unimaginable scale in which hundreds of thousands of culprits and their helpers, in large areas of Europe, tortured and murdered millions of victims under the eyes of a huge number of spectators. A great many institutions fulfilling the most diverse functions were involved in the genocide, and considerable differences and chronological discrepancies can be established between the individual countries and regions in which the genocide took place.

In view of the complexity of events, the prehistory of the murder of the Jews cannot be assessed in accordance with the pattern 'decision formation - decision - implementation of decision'. The more we discover about the activity of the apparatus that prepared and organized the murder of the European Jews, the clearer it becomes that the history of the genocide can be presented only inadequately and fragmentarily as the history of its institutions. For an interpretation of the genesis of the 'final solution', we need a wider framework, and it seems that the term 'policy' can help us out here (13). Historiography increasingly comprehends the 'decision-making process leading to the final solution' within a more inclusive framework of a policy of persecuting and murdering Jews under German rule.

II. The elements of the policy of annihilation

The most important elements of this policy of annihilation can be described as follows:

It was geared to abstract, high-level, ideological aims that were continuously and persistently pursued by the Nazi movement.

It was closely interdependent with other areas of policy, penetrating and partly re-defining them, but, on the other hand, was also influenced by them.

It was developed over a long period, and adopted different forms at various stages of the 'Third Reich'. It was flexible enough to be modified, delayed or accelerated on tactical grounds; in certain critical situations it developed rapidly, so that concept, decision-making and implementation could not always be clearly distinguished from each other.

It was basically a matter of consensus within the leadership of the 'Third Reich'. The fact that there were endless internal conflicts over its implementation, and that parts of the persecution apparatus demanded more radical action, confirms the existence of that consensus, which was never itself called into question in those disagreements.

It was supported by at least part of the population (the active supporters of National Socialism). It was publicly – even if in semi-camouflaged form – propagated, debated and legitimized. It was of immense importance to the Nazi penetration of German society, and was essential to the safeguarding and expansion of Nazi rule.

 

The policy of annihilation and its historical pre-conditions occupy a central place in the interpretation of the 'Third Reich'. If it is assumed that the real historical peculiarity and singularity of the Nazi dictatorship was enshrined in the murder of the European Jews, then it seems appropriate to regard the genocide as the central theme of the history of the 'Third Reich' and not to see it as a mere function, side-effect or consequence of other historical phenomena of the period.

The starting-point of any interpretation oriented to the centrality of 'Jewish policy' should be the realization that Nazism had set itself the aim of creating a completely new form of social order, a racially homogeneous 'national community' (Volksgemeinschaft). This aim determines the identity of Nazism as a unique historical movement. As a matter of domestic policy, the National Socialists derived their entire claim to power over German society from this mission; and as a matter of foreign policy, the asserted concept of the 'Aryan race', with its accompanying drive for 'living space', was supposed to lay the foundation for a new order for the European continent along racist lines. However, because of the inconsistency of the racist concept, these aims could only be achieved by destructive measures. The 'racial elite' propagated by the Nazis implied permanent exclusion and eradication of so-called 'inferiors'. In addition to 'racial hygiene', the persecution of the Jews took on a central role because of their allegedly 'foreign blood'; the relatively new racist theme was combined with the centuries-old stereotypes of conventional hostility towards the Jews. We must therefore investigate the frightful utopia of a social order whose desired 'homogeneity' and whose attempt at biological 'species enhancement' actually entailed the consistent exclusion and elimination of 'inferiors'.


Notes
1   Particularly Helmut Krausnick, ‘Judenverfolgung’, in: Hans Buchheim et al., Anatomie des SS-Staates, vol.2., 2nd ed. (Munich: dtv, 1979), 235-366, pp297, 305f; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide. Himmler and the Final Solution, (New York: Knopf, 1991); Wolfgang Benz, Der Holocaust, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), p50ff.
2   Saul Friedländer, ‘Vom Antisemitismus zur Judenvernichtung: Eine historiographische Studie zur nationalsozialistischen Judenpolitik und Versuch einer Interpretation’, 18-62, p47, in: Eberhard Jäckel, Jürgen Rohwer (eds.), Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Entschlußbildung und Verwirklichung, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1985); Raul Hilberg, ‘Die Aktion Reinhard’, in ibid, 125-136.
3   Phillipe Burrin, Hitler and the Jews. The Genesis of the Holocaust, (London: Arnold, 1989), p115ff.
4   Christian Gerlach, ‘Die Wannsee-Konferenz, das Schicksal der deutschen Juden und Hitlers politische Grundsatzenscheidung, alle Juden Europas zu ermorden’, Werkstattgeschichte, vol. 18 (1997), 7-44.
5   See for instance the exposition by Pohl, National-sozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 (München: Oldenbourg, 1996), p203ff.
6   Martin Broszat, ‘Hitler und die Genesis der "Endlösung". Aus Anlaß der Thesen von David Irving’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol.25 (1977), 739-775, p752. Similarly argued is Hans Mommsen, ‘Die Realisierung des Utopischen: Die "Endlösung der Judenfrage" im "Dritten Reich"’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, vol.9 (1983), 381-420, p417, in which he establishes apodictically that it may be fundamentally discounted (‘grundsätzlich auszuschließen’) that Hitler set the policy of genocide in process with a direct ‘Führer-instruction’ (‘Führerweisung’).
7   Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung; Thomas Sandkühler, Die ‘Endlösung’ in Galizien. Der Judenmord in Ostgalizien und die Rettungsinitiative von Berthold Beitz, 1941-1944, (Bonn: Dietz, 1996).
8   Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde; Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944, (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999).
9   Die Judenpolitik des SD 1935 bis 1938, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995).
10   Götz Aly, ‘Endlösung’.Völkerverschiebung un der Mord an den europäischen Juden, (Frankfurt/M: S Fischer, 1995). Eng. trans. ‘Final Solution’. Nazi Population Policy and the Murder of the European Jews, (London: Arnold, 1995).
11   Ralf Ogorreck, Die Einsatzgruppen und die ‘Genesis der Endlösung’, (Berlin:Metropol, 1996).
12    Peter Witte et. al. (eds.), Der Dienstkalender Heinrich 1941/42, (Hamburg: Christians, 1999).
13   On the concept of ‘Judenpolitik’ see in the first instance Uwe Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich, (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1972), or more recently Wildt (ed.), Judenpolitik.

Part 2

*) Longerich, Peter: The Wannsee Conference in the Development of the Final Solution'.
London: The Holocaust Educational Trust. 2000, 29 p.
(Holocaust Educational Trust Research Papers. Vol. 1, no. 2, 1999/2000)
ISBN 0-9516166-5-X; http://www.het.org.uk