The Berlin Police after World War II
Although the German police were highly complicit in the crimes committed by the Nazis, after the war ended, the help of the police was urgently needed in Germany’s reconstruction. The Allies efforts to reorganise the police force warrant a closer look. An essay by our colleague Dr Jakob Müller.
In Nazi Germany, the police were more than just a law enforcement agency and an executive authority: they were a central part of Nazi politics and ideology. Heinrich Himmler, who held the title of ‘Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police’ after 1936, pushed for a merger between the police and the SS. The Secret State Police (Gestapo) became synonymous with terror, first in Germany and later in the occupied territories. The mass murder of European Jews was planned and carried out by German police officers.
The criminal nature of the police was not only evident at the top of the hierarchy and at the murder sites in Eastern Europe, but also as an integral part of each officer’s daily work routine. In 1940, for example, Berlin police officers were instructed to hand over Polish forced labourers to the Gestapo if they had ‘sexual relations with a Reich citizen’. The officers knew that these people would be murdered.1
The Terror Apparatus in the Final Year of War: Disintegration and Radicalisation
Reports from the front and the mass destruction of cities made it evident that Germany could no longer win the war, and cracks in the regime were also beginning to appear. The failed coup of 20 July 1944 shook the SS and the police, as Berlin’s police president Wolf Graf von Helldorff and the head of the Reich Criminal Police Office, Arthur Nebe were among the conspirators. The regime responded to the rebellion with further radicalisation, which also affected ‘Volksgenossen’. When hungry women stormed two bakeries in the Berlin suburb of Rahnsdorf on 6 April 1945, the police arrested 15 looters, two of whom were executed.
The persecution of Jews did not cease until the Allies defeated Germany. A transport left Berlin for the Theresienstadt ghetto as late as 27 March 1945. 2Like previous deportations, this one was carried out by the police. Within the police, Nazi laws were also enforced until the very end. On 24 April 1945, four Berlin police officers accused of homosexuality were executed for violating Section 175.3
The Battle of Berlin ended a few days later, after which the Red Army occupied the city. Many police officers had been killed in the fighting, but some managed to flee to the West. Most were taken captive as prisoners of war. Erik von Heimburg, commander of the Berlin police force, was sentenced to death as a war criminal in the Soviet Union and executed in May 1946.4 Police President Kurt Göhrum died in a Soviet camp in 1953. August Heißmeyer, Senior SS and Police Leader for Berlin and Brandenburg, managed to flee to the West, where he was convicted but soon after pardoned. He lived with his wife, former Reich Women’s Leader Gertrud Scholtz-Klink, in Schwäbisch Hall, until his death in 1979.
Unlike the Western Allies, the Soviet Union had undertaken to train Germans during the war so that they could support the work of the administration in the future occupation zone. These included exiles from the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD) and prisoners of war who had agreed to cooperate with the Red Army in the ‘Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland’. They were brought to occupied Germany in small groups in April and May 1945. The most important of these groups was deployed in Berlin and led by Walter Ulbricht, who later became the head of the German Democratic Republic, GDR (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, DDR). Its aim was to establish facts on the ground before the Western Allies took over their sectors. On 9 May 1945, one day after Germany’s official surrender, Ulbricht was ready with a list of names for the Berlin city administration.
The Soviets, and thus also to the ‘Ulbricht Group’, recognised that they could not take power alone. They therefore pursued a ‘popular front’ or ‘united front’ strategy: they would include Social Democrats, trade unionists and other opposition figures in the government, but their activities would be monitored by reliable Communists who had direct access to the Soviet occupying power, many of whom held deputy posts and ran personnel departments. On 17 May, City Commander Nikolai Bersarin appointed the non-party member and politically inexperienced Arthur Werner as mayor, but the real power lay with his deputy, the future GDR interior minister Karl Maron. Wolfgang Leonhard, who belonged to the ‘Ulbricht Group’ in 1945, summed up this approach in a single sentence: ‘It should look democratic, but we must maintain control of everything.’5
‘The New Berlin Police’
On 25 May, Paul Markgraf, just 34 years old, was appointed the first postwar police president. A highly decorated Wehrmacht officer, he was taken prisoner at Stalingrad in 1943, after which he joined the ‘Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland’ led by Walter Ulbricht.6 On 21 June 1945, he wrote an article about ‘The New Berlin Police’ in the Berliner Zeitung, a newspaper published by the Soviet occupying power. Markgraf stressed that ‘in most cases, it was the police units who were responsible for the terrible, inhuman and sadistic atrocities and cruelties committed in the occupied countries, and especially in the territories of the Soviet Union.’ He felt that the SS and Gestapo were not alone responsible for the crimes and that the police as a whole must be held accountable. He thus concluded that a complete overhaul of the police was necessary. Markgraf began referring to the police as the ‘Volkspolizei’, and this later became the official name of the new police force established in the GDR. It would be established ‘by the people for the people’. He argued that great care must be taken during the selection process to ensure ‘no fascist elements find refuge’. A break ‘with all previous traditions’ was required. By this, Markgraf meant not only a break with National Socialism, but also with the Weimar Republic. He evoked the 1st of May 1929, referring to ‘Berlin’s Bloody Sunday’, when the then police chief had ordered ‘his police to shoot at demonstrating workers.’7
Markgraf wanted both a fresh start in terms of personnel and a clean break from the Berlin police force led by Social Democrats before 1933.
A Fresh Start with New Personnel
Establishing loyal security forces was a key objective of the Soviet occupying power, and a particularly large number of KPD members were hired for this purpose. Of the 300 communist prisoners freed from the Brandenburg prison, 200 were employed by the Berlin police.8 Since most of these Communists had no administrative experience, several Social Democrats who had served as police officers in the Weimar Republic were also recruited. These included the first commander of the Schutzpolizei, Karl Heinrich, and his successor, Hans Kanig, as well as the head of the police president department, Johannes Stumm, who later became the first police president in West Berlin.
Social Democrats and Communists agreed that they needed a fresh start with new personnel, which explains why so few former police officers remained in office. As a transitional measure, Markgraf allowed each police station to hire one police officer who had served under National Socialism. In the summer of 1945, this amounted to only 5-6% of all police officers. Their proportion increased over time, but remained relatively low at 9% in the Schutzpolizei and 11.8% in the Kriminalpolizei. In contrast, one in four officers in the Berlin Verwaltungspolizei, which was responsible for registration and trade supervision, had also worked under the Nazis.9 The professional civil service was abolished in the Soviet occupation zone (Sowjetische Besatzungszone, SBZ) and all Nazi Party members were dismissed from public service on 1 October 1945.10
This handling of the police in Berlin greatly differed from that in the Western occupation zones, especially from the British zone, where SPD chairman Kurt Schumacher complained in 1946 of ‘experiencing a new Himmler police force’.11 The Criminal Investigation Department in the British zone, the forerunner of the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA), was run almost exclusively by former SS members.12
The lack of experienced personnel led to a massive recruitment campaign. Because a large number of the files had been destroyed or were inaccessible, it was nearly impossible to determine whether someone had been a Nazi or not.13 In March 1946, Berlin’s deputy police vice-president Heinz Kionka was dismissed when it was disclosed that he had been a member of the SS. He had been hired at the suggestion of the KPD.14
The employment offers for the rank and file were generous. The regular meals served to employees made the profession particularly attractive. Staff turnover was so high that Berliners joked, ‘Everyone joins the police at some point.’ In 1946, 8,819 (approx. 70%) of 12,533 police officers left the force. Most left of their own accord (5,179), 2,836 were deemed unfit for service, 607 left due to criminal activities and 62 because they had provided false personal data (mostly concealing their membership in NSDAP).15
One important innovation was the recruitment of women, not only in the criminal investigation department, where they were mainly in charge of youth and public morality issues, but also in the Schutzpolizei. Pictures of female traffic officers standing in front of building ruins are among the most iconic images of this era. The SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) defended the deployment of women and demanded equal pay for equal work.16 They demanded that women not only be employed in the traffic police and administrative offices, but also be allowed to serve on patrol duty. These changes, however, were met with strong resistance from men and the West eventually rolled back these reforms. Women were not allowed to join the uniformed police force again in West Berlin until the late 1970s.17
Structural Continuity
While the police force was genuinely undergoing a new beginning in terms of personnel, the Soviet city commander of Berlin, Nikolai Bersarin, ordered the police to be rebuilt as an agency with a conventional structure.18 The agency continued to be divided into separate uniform and criminal police divisions and Markgraf successfully opposed demands to separate the Verwaltungspolizei, which was responsible for registration and trade supervision, from the rest of the force.19 The political police was entirely abolished, as stipulated by Law 31 of the Allied Control Council. In the Soviet occupation zone, the conditions were soon ripe for the establishment of a political police force under new circumstances.
While the Western powers reversed ‘Reichification’,20 i.e., the central control of the police by Reich authorities (Reichssicherheitshauptamt and Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei), preparations were made in the Soviet occupation zone for the establishment of a centralised police administration. On 30 July 1946, the German Administration of the Interior (DVdI) was founded to ‘coordinate police work more closely across the borders of the states and provinces as well as centrally manage the police forces throughout the Soviet occupation zone’.21
Initially, the police were not under the authority of the German administration. The agency was controlled by the Soviet administration and, after the Western Allies arrived, by the Allied Command.
Policing at the End of the War
The conditions under which the largely inexperienced police officers began their work were difficult. Criminals in Berlin with access to a large supply of firearms were terrorising the devastated city. The police, on the other hand, were only equipped with wooden batons and remained without standardised uniforms until early 1946.22
The decision to have the police focus its energy on combating the black market – on which most Berliners depended for their survival – did not make them popular. Moreover, the Red Army, which had conquered Berlin at great cost and saw itself more as a victor over fascism than as a liberator, had a monopoly on the use of force.
The unarmed Berlin police were powerless to change this situation, according to a Communist Party group in Tegel that complained about looting and rape in June 1945.23 The police were not even allowed to record the crimes committed by the occupying soldiers, let alone take action against them and risk being attacked themselves. Red Army soldiers repeatedly vandalised police stations and stole service bicycles.24 A service ID card issued to a Berlin police officer on 6 June 1945 stated: ‘He is allowed to pass freely. His bicycle must not be confiscated. He is exempt from any other work duties.’25
The Police in the Four-Sector City
Rapes and other acts of violence continued to occur in the Soviet sector, whereas in the Western sectors, French, British and US military police began taking strong action against marauding Red Army soldiers in July 1945.26 The Americans printed cards with the English words for ‘robbery,’ ‘murder’ and ‘rape’ on them, so that Berlin police officers could ask the nearest US soldier for help in an emergency.27 No doubt most Berliners were relieved to see the Western Allies arrive, but from a communist perspective, it represented a disruption to their efforts to establish ‘anti-fascist democratic police forces’.28
France, the US and Great Britain removed communist police chiefs and officers from their zones; most of them were promptly hired in the Soviet sector. The introduction of four ‘sector assistants’ in October 1946 formalised the occupying powers’ authority over the police in their respective sectors. However, the Soviets prevented these changes from being implemented in the central administration, most specifically the attempts to dismiss Police President Markgraf.
The Western powers were able to rely primarily on the Social Democrats in the police force who had been recruited under Soviet occupation, a fact that caused lasting resentment among their communist colleagues. As recently as 1987, an East German historian claimed that the Social Democrats had ‘exploited the fact that, as members of the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands), they had been disciplined under the fascist civil service law and dismissed from the police force in 1933, in order to rejoin the police force after the defeat of fascism and acquire senior positions.’ After initially cooperating ‘loyally’, they became ‘determined representatives of the reactionary forces when the Western powers arrived in Berlin.’29 In the struggle for control of the police force, even murder was not ruled out, as illustrated by the fate of Karl Heinrich, who became commander of the Berlin Schutzpolizei in May 1945. The Soviets soon regretted this decision because the Social Democrat acted independently and advised the Western Allies to dismiss the Communists. On 2 August, he was arrested by the Soviet secret service NKVD while in conversation with Police President Markgraf. Heinrich, who had survived several Nazi concentration camps and prisons, died in the Soviet special camp in Hohenschönhausen on 3 November 1945. Neither his relatives nor the public were informed of his death.30
Like Heinrich, thousands of Berliners disappeared without a trace in the postwar years. Markgraf was strongly criticised for this, in particular because the police were suspected of being involved in these abductions. The police chief denied the allegations, however, and shifted responsibility to the Soviet authorities.
There were historical reasons why the rivalry between the two workers’ parties in the Berlin police force was more bitter than in other areas. Before 1933, the KPD and the SPD-led police force had been bitter enemies. The Communists suffered the most victims, as illustrated by the ‘Bloody May’ of 1929. But police officers were also killed. On 9 August 1931, police captains Paul Anlauf and Franz Lenck – both Social Democrats – were shot in the back at Bülowplatz – today’s Rosa-Luxemburg-Platz. The attack, which took place near the KPD party headquarters, was committed in retaliation for the shooting of a Communist the previous day.
One of the murderers was Erich Mielke, who succeeded in fleeing to the Soviet Union. After returning to Berlin, he was initially assigned to the police station in his home district of Wedding in June 1945, and later to Lichtenberg. On 30 July 1946, he was appointed vice-president of the newly founded German Administration of the Interior (DVdI), which was responsible for coordinating the security authorities in the Soviet occupation zone.31 Mielke, who would later become the head of the GDR’s secret police, was already involved in establishing a political police force.
On 7 February 1947, the Mitte District Court issued an arrest warrant for Mielke for the 1931 murders,32 but this ultimately led nowhere. Instead, on 29 May 1947, Wilhelm Kühnast, the public prosecutor in charge of the case, was placed under house arrest and accused by the Soviet authorities of destroying files from the (Nazi) People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof) and delaying proceedings against Nazi perpetrators, among other things.33 Kühnast fled to West Berlin a year later. The Berlin Regional Court did not convict Mielke of the murders at Bülowplatz until 1993. The conviction was based partially on the indictment that had been brought before the same court in 1934.
The Division of the Berlin Police
In April 1946, the KPD merged with a minority of the SPD to form the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED). Outside the Soviet occupation zone, the Western Allies in Berlin had been able to prevent the forced merger. In the first free elections, the SPD, which had remained independent in Berlin – including in the Soviet sector – became the strongest party by a large margin, winning 48.7% of the vote. The SED came in third with 19.8%, behind the CDU with 22.2%.
The Communists were shocked by the election results. Now that the united front strategy had clearly failed, they were able to drop their democratic mask. Or, as it was stated in one book of GDR historiography: ‘The development of the Berlin police was significantly influenced by the results of the elections held on 20 October 1946 [...]. The election results, which gave reactionary bourgeois politicians a majority in the city parliament, made it easier for the opponents of democracy and progress to pursue a restorative course in Berlin.’34
With the support of the Soviet city commander, Police President Markgraf resisted being made subordinate to the new magistrate. Since decisions by the Allied Command had to be made unanimously, his dismissal required the consent of the Soviets. Thus, he remained in office – and in constant conflict with the magistrate and the city council, which passed a vote of no confidence against him on 13 November 1947, with the SED opposing the measure.35
There was no denying the strong divide within the police force by then. In March 1948, the sector assistant in the US sector was instructed to stop accepting orders from the police chief. After the police failed to intervene against communist demonstrators in front of the city council on 23 June 1948, Mayor Ferdinand Friedensburg suspended Markgraf and appointed his deputy, Johannes Stumm, police president. Stumm ordered the police officers to report to Friesenstraße in Kreuzberg in the US sector, and 70% complied. The files of the central authorities, however, remained in the Soviet sector.36 The Soviet blockade of the Western sectors, which began the following day, marked the beginning of the division of the city and consequently, the division of the police.
The ‘Markgraf Police’ and ‘Stumm Police,’ as they were dubbed by the opposing press, accused each other of being divisive. Police officers were occasionally arrested in the other part of the city and then released in exchange for abducted colleagues from the opposing side.
Frequent questions arose over how the Social Democrats had acted under the Nazis. The Berliner Zeitung wrote of Stumm: ‘Strange that he did not end up in a concentration camp like so many upright anti-fascists – including those from the SPD. Instead, he was picked up in the same year by the first Gestapo chief, the notorious Dr Diels, and asked to collaborate. He is said to have refused the offer.’37 The GDR press continued to refer to the West Berlin police as the ‘Stumm Police’ or ‘Stupo’ until Stumm retired in 1962.
Not all of the accusations were unfounded. As early as 1947, former Wehrmacht officers and a few former Nazis were recruited in the Western sectors.38 Of the 2,000 police officers who joined the West Berlin police force in early 1950, the majority were former members of the Wehrmacht.39 By the time the Federal Republic was founded, hiring former Nazis was no longer an exception that had to be justified; it was the rule. Most of the people designated ‘131ers’ under the relevant article of the Basic Law were Nazis who had been dismissed under Allied regulations. These ‘displaced members of the civil service,’ as they were called in federal law, were subject to an ‘accommodation obligation.’ At least 20% of the personnel resources of the federal, state and local governments had to be spent on this group, explicitly including those who had been transferred ‘ex officio’ to an ‘office of the former Secret State Police.’40
Soon, the old elites were also swarming around Berlin police stations. It was left to the GDR to draw attention to this. In the ‘Brown Book’ published in 1965, an entire chapter was dedicated to the West Berlin police. It includes Kurt Gehrmann, who commanded the notorious Police Battalion 316 from July 1943 to July 1944, which oversaw the removal of mass graves by Jewish forced labourers, among other things. Sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment in the Soviet Union, Gehrmann was handed over to the West German authorities in 1955, after which he was promptly employed by the West Berlin police.41
The three years between May 1945 and July 1948 were formative for both Berlin police forces, and even more so for the entire GDR. Much of the GDR leadership had begun their careers in Berlin in 1945, including Walter Ulbricht, Erich Honecker and the head of the GDR’s secret police, Erich Mielke. The GDR was more diligent in its effort to remove former Nazis from the security forces than the West had been. Yet the structures and powers of the East German police force more strongly resembled its Nazi predecessor than did its Western counterpart. Like Nazi Germany, the GDR was an authoritarian dictatorship with centrally organised security agencies. There was no clear separation between intelligence and police tasks, and the GDR’s secret police was de facto largely beyond the control of the courts.
Amtliche Mitteilungen des Polizeipräsidiums von Berlin, Jg. 1940, Nr. 16 (25 May 1940), nach: digital.zlb.de/viewer/image/16319771_1940/157/ (accessed on 25 March 2025).
↩Akim Jah, Die Deportation der Juden aus Berlin. Die nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik und das Sammellager Große Hamburger Straße, Berlin 2013, p. 530 f.
↩Mick Schmeitzner, Konsequente Abrechnung? NS-Eliten im Visier sowjetischer Gerichte 1945– 1947, in: Andreas Weigelt u.a. (Red.), Todesurteile sowjetischer Militärtribunale gegen Deutsche (1944-1947), Göttingen 2015, p. 69.
↩Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Walter Ulbricht. Der kommunistische Diktator 1945-1973, Munich 2024, pp. 35-43.
↩Friedrich Dickel u.a. (Red.), Geschichte der deutschen Volkspolizei, Bd. 1: 1945-1961, Berlin (Ost) 1987, p. 124.
↩Markgraf refers erroneously to a ‘Bloody Sunday’; the correct term is ‘Bloody May’: For several days after the demonstrations of 1 May 1929, the police took drastic measures against members and supporters of the Communist Party. Several people were killed and injured. Paul Markgraf, Die neue Berliner Polizei, in: Berliner Zeitung, 21 June 1945, p. 1.
↩Norbert Steinborn and Hilmar Krüger, Die Berliner Polizei 1945 bis 1992. Von der Militärreserve im Kalten Krieg auf dem Weg zur bürgernahen Polizei? Berlin 1993, p. 5.
↩Waldemar Bergmann / Günter Malitz, Der Aufbau der demokratischen Polizei in Berlin 1945, in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 13 (1965), pp. 446-463, here: p. 448.
↩Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 9. bis 11. Mai 1946 in Hannover, Hamburg 1947, p. 29.
↩Imanuel Baumann u.a. (ed.), Schatten der Vergangenheit. Das BKA und seine Gründungsgeneration in der frühen Bundesrepublik, Cologne 2011.
↩Ibid., p. 49: Neues Deutschland, 13 March 1946, p. 3; speech by city councilman Franz L. Neumann (SPD) on 7 January 1947, in: Stenographischer Bericht der Stadtverordnetenversammlung zu Berlin, Ausgabe 1947, p. 51.
↩Ursula Nienhaus, „Für strenge Dienstzucht ungeeignete Objekte...“. Weibliche Polizei in Berlin 1945 –1951, in: Gerhard Fürmetz u.a. (ed.), Nachkriegspolizei. Sicherheit und Ordnung in Ost- und Westdeutschland 1945-1969, Hamburg 2001, pp. 129-153; Richard Bessel, Volkspolizistinnen in der SBZ/DDR, ibid., pp. 155-167.
↩Ibid., p. 30; Herbert Reinke, „Angleichungsdienstrang der leitenden Beamten des kriminalpolizeilichen Vollzugsdienstes beim Bundeskriminalamt“. (Wieder-) Aufstieg und (weicher) Fall einer Funktionselite nach 1945, in: Jan Erik Schulte / Michael Wildt (ed.), Die SS nach 1945. Entschuldungsnarrative, populäre Mythen, europäische Erinnerungsdiskurse, Göttingen 2017, pp. 209-228, here: p. 213; Paul Markgraf, Wir packen mit an, Ordnung zu schaffen, in: Berliner Zeitung, 27 May 1945, p. 2.
↩Gerhard Fürmetz / Herbert Reinke / Klaus Weinhauer, Nachkriegspolizei in Deutschland. Doppelte Polizeigeschichte 1945-1969, in: Dies, Nachkriegspolizei. Sicherheit und Ordnung in Ost- und Westdeutschland, Hamburg 2001, pp. 7-34, p.8.
↩Jochen Staadt, „Wir packen mit an, Ordnung zu schaffen“. Die Berliner Polizei in der „Stunde Null“, in: Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat Nr. 28 (2010), pp. 90-117, here: p.105 f.
↩Hartmut Pech, Polizeidienstausweise 1945 bis 1950. Von der handgroßen Pappkarte zum amtlichen Vordruck, in: Berliner Polizeigeschichte 69 (2020), Nr. 5, p. 16-22, here: p. 20.
↩Jürgen Wetzel, Office of Military Government for Berlin Sector, in: Christoph Weisz (ed.), OMGUS-Handbuch. Die amerikanische Militärregierung in Deutschland 1945-1949, Munich 1994, pp. 673-738, here: p. 679; Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk / Stefan Wolle, Roter Stern über Deutschland: sowjetische Truppen in der DDR, Berlin 2010, p. 39.
↩Horst Vierthaler, Das Ende der einheitlichen Polizei, pp. 60-66, here: p. 65, in: Berliner Polizei. Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, hg. von der v. Hinckeldey-Stiftung, Berlin 1999.
↩“Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse der unter Artikel 131 des Grundgesetzes fallenden Personen vom 11. Mai 1951”, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1, 1951, Nr. 22.
↩Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland (ed.), Braunbuch. Kriegs- und Naziverbrecher in der Bundesrepublik, Berlin 1965, p. 104; Stefan Klemp, „Nicht ermittelt“. Polizeibataillone und die Nachkriegsjustiz, Berlin 2022, pp. 337-341, 534-534; Wolfgang Curilla, Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weissrussland 1941 - 1944, Paderborn 2006, p. 543 f.
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